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A B S T R ACT. This article explores the response of the moderate wing of the civil rights movement to the
war in Vietnam. The moderates, made up of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP ), the National Urban League, and leaders such as Bayard Rustin and A. Philip Randolph, were
initially opposed to the civil rights movement taking a stand against the war. This reluctance was the result of
a number of factors, including anti-communism and their own closeness with the administration of President
Lyndon Johnson. Crucially, it also resulted from their own experiences of the black freedom struggle itself.
The article also documents and analyses the growing anti-war dissent amongst the moderates, culminating in
the decision of both the NAACP and the Urban League to adopt an anti-war stance at the end of the 1960s.
Despite this, they remained unenthusiastic about participating in peace movement activities, and the reasons
for this are explained. Finally, the article suggests that the war was important in exposing existing divisions
within the civil rights movement, as well as in generating new ones.
I
On 4 April 1967, Martin Luther King, Jr, launched a powerful attack on
America’s war in Vietnam. Speaking from the pulpit of New York City’s River-
side Church, the nation’s most prominent civil rights leader condemned the
war for undermining the Great Society and for disproportionately taking African
Americans to die abroad for freedoms they did not yet enjoy at home. Portraying
the conﬂict as a civil war in which America had needlessly meddled, King charged
his own government with being the ‘greatest purveyor of violence in the world
today ’.1 The Riverside speech was one of the strongest attacks on the Vietnam
War by a prominent African American, but King was far from the only black
leader to oppose it. In January 1966, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
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Committee (SNCC) formally opposed the war, and they were soon followed
by the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE); Muhammad Ali and the Black
Panthers also bitterly denounced it. Nevertheless, the civil rights movement
was far from united in its reaction to Vietnam, and a number of important organ-
izations and inﬂuential individuals were extremely reluctant to take a position on
the conﬂict.
This article seeks to explore the reaction to the Vietnam War of the moderate
wing of the civil rights movement. Unlike the militants of SNCC and CORE, the
Black Panther revolutionaries, or the increasingly radical King, the moderate
wing of the movement, which had always been somewhat ambivalent about
direct action and street protest, continued to believe in working within the
American political system to bring about change. It also retained its faith in the
ability of the federal government to solve the race problem through legislation
and anti-poverty programmes. The moderate wing was made up of numerous
groups and leaders, but at its centre stood the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). America’s largest and oldest civil
rights organization had grown increasingly conservative in the years following the
SecondWorld War. During the 1940s and 1950s the Association had attempted to
dissociate itself from more radical civil rights groups such as CORE, and it had
accepted the domestic and foreign implications of anti-communism. Although
the NAACP supported many of the civil rights demonstrations of the 1960s,
frequently supplying bail money and legal help, it remained lukewarm to the
tactics of protest. Robert Cook, for example, has argued that the Association
‘ failed to embrace wholeheartedly the concept of nonviolent direct action’.2 The
organization preferred to concentrate its eﬀorts in Washington, DC, in an
attempt to win support for progressive legislation by lobbying congressmen, and
by using litigation to strike down segregation laws.3 The NAACP’s executive
director, RoyWilkins, was a prominent civil rights moderate. After an early career
in journalism, Wilkins had been appointed assistant secretary of the NAACP
in 1931. Three years later he replaced W. E. B. Du Bois as editor of the Crisis,
the Association’s magazine, before succeeding Walter White as head of the
organization in 1955. According to Robert Cook, Wilkins was ‘ temperamentally
unprepared ’ to commit the Association to a strategy of civil disobedience and
protest. He was also equivocal about the eﬀorts of groups like SNCC to build
a civil rights movement from the bottom up by fostering indigenous black
leadership and empowering local African Americans.4
2 Robert Cook, Sweet land of liberty ? The African-American struggle for civil rights in the twentieth century
(London and New York, 1998), p. 118.
3 Denton L. Watson, ‘Reassessing the role of the NAACP in the civil rights movement’, Historian,
55 (1993), pp. 453–68; andWatson, ‘The papers of the ‘‘101st senator ’’ : Clarence Mitchell Jr. and civil
rights ’, Historian, 63 (2002), pp. 623–41.
4 Roy Wilkins with Tom Matthews, Standing fast : the autobiography of Roy Wilkins (New York, 1994),
pp. xi, 19, 45–6, 48–9, 55–6, 104–7, 154–5, 220; see, for example, John Dittmer’s account of how the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) national leadership helped to
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The moderate wing also included the National Urban League (NUL) and its
leader, Whitney M. Young, Jr. Young, a native of Kentucky and former Dean
of Social Work at Atlanta University, was appointed executive director of the
Urban League in 1960. At six feet two inches tall and weighing around two
hundred pounds, he cut an imposing ﬁgure. Young’s biographer, Nancy J. Weiss,
has written that ‘everyone who knew him remarked on his style : frank, without
pretense ; exuberant, eager to take on the challenges and pleasures of life ;
aggressive, indefatigable, a study in perpetual motion’. Though traditionally a
black social service agency rather than a protest organization, Young helped to
make the Urban League a part of the civil rights movement. While he ‘ led no
demonstrations and changed no laws ’, Young’s work, out of the public eye, in
selling civil rights to powerful whites and trying to secure greater job oppor-
tunities for black Americans was vitally important. He was also able to act as an
eﬀective mediator within the civil rights movement, helping to keep the peace and
smooth over tensions. Bayard Rustin described him as an essential part of ‘ the
concrete that kept the bricks from falling apart ’.5
Rustin himself is something of an enigmatic ﬁgure within the civil rights
movement. Initially no moderate, the chain smoking, guitar playing, folk singing
Quaker became less radical as the 1960s progressed. Rustin, a former ﬁeld
secretary with the paciﬁst Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), had helped tutor
Martin Luther King in Gandhian nonviolence during the Montgomery Bus
Boycott. He also played a critical role in the founding of the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference (SCLC) in 1957, and was largely responsible for organ-
izing the August 1963 March on Washington, at which Martin Luther King
delivered his memorable ‘I Have a Dream’ speech.6 By the mid-1960s, however,
Rustin – along with his mentor A. Philip Randolph – was urging the civil rights
movement to move from the streets into legislative halls and courtrooms. This
contrasted with civil rights activists from the radical wing of the movement who
were becoming increasingly critical of mainstream American institutions and
values.7
Between 1965 and 1968, the moderates refused to take a position on the war in
Southeast Asia, believing that to do so would only harm the struggle for black
equality. They adopted what Manfred Berg has termed the ‘ separate issues
doctrine ’, which held that the war and civil rights were entirely distinct issues that
blunt the radicalism of the movement in Jackson, Mississippi – John Dittmer, Local people : the struggle for
civil rights in Mississippi (Urbana and Chicago, 1994), pp. 160–9; Cook, Sweet land of liberty ?, pp. 117–18,
223. For the grass-roots perspective, see especially Charles M. Payne, I’ve got the light of freedom: the
organizing tradition and the Mississippi freedom struggle (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1995).
5 Nancy J. Weiss, Whitney M. Young, Jr., and the struggle for civil rights (Princeton, NJ, 1989), pp. xi–xii,
4, 119.
6 Adam Fairclough, Better day coming: blacks and equality, 1890–2000 (New York and London, 2001),
p. 236; Ling, Martin Luther King, Jr., pp. 47–8; and Jervis Anderson, Bayard Rustin : troubles I’ve seen :
a biography (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1997), pp. 186–9, 198, 247–64.
7 Cook, Sweet land of liberty?, pp. 201–2, 208.
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should not be mixed.8 For example, NAACP executive director Roy Wilkins
insisted that diverting attention to Vietnam would weaken the ﬁght for black
progress, while Bayard Rustin argued that involvement of civil rights groups in
anti-war activities would be ‘distinctly unproﬁtable and perhaps even suicidal ’.9
From 1969, the moderates ﬁnally spoke out against the war, but remained
unenthusiastic about participating in anti-war activities.
A detailed analysis of the moderates’ response helps us to expand our under-
standing of the civil rights movement. Indeed, while we know a good deal about
those African American groups that opposed the war, those who did not take a
stand have tended to be dismissed as conservative sell-outs. Many historians of the
civil rights movement appear to have shared, at least implicitly, the view of one
contemporary critic who believed that the NAACP had become ‘ little more than
an Administration houseboy’.10 The time for a more nuanced explanation is long
overdue.
I I
Roy Wilkins had, as early as July 1965, stated his belief that if the civil rights
movement went ‘oﬀ on a foreign policy kick ’ it would ‘weaken its eﬀectiveness
in discharging its major responsibility ’ at home; and he consistently resisted
attempts to link the peace and freedom movements.11 In the summer of 1965, for
example, Wilkins attacked the Assembly of Unrepresented People, an early at-
tempt at bringing together the peace, civil rights, and anti-poverty causes.12 The
NAACP head believed that white radicals were trying to manipulate blacks
into supporting anti-war activities by feigning concern over civil rights. Wilkins
warned local NAACP leaders against becoming involved in the AUP, told them
that ‘organized units ’ of the Association had no authority to participate, and,
recognizing that it was ‘diﬃcult for the public to dissociate them from the
8 See Manfred Berg, ‘Guns, butter, and civil rights : the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People and the Vietnam War, 1964–1968’, in David K. Adams and Cornelius A. van
Minnen, eds., Aspects of war in American history (Keele, 1997), p. 220.
9 Letter from Roy Wilkins to Joseph Stern, 17 Mar. 1966, in NAACP papers, group IV box A86,
folder ‘Vietnam correspondence, 1966’, Library of Congress, Washington, DC; report from the
New York Times, 3 Aug. 1965, C.P. 16, in Howard Zinn papers (processed), box 3, folder 5, State
Historical Society of Wisconsin (SHSW), and Bayard Rustin, ‘Dr. King’s painful dilemma’, in Bayard
Rustin, Down the line : the collected writings of Bayard Rustin (Chiacgo, 1971), pp. 169–70.
10 Henry Wallace to John Morsell, 13 Jan. 1966, in NAACP papers, group IV box A86, folder
‘Vietnam correspondence, 1966’, Library of Congress. Although Manfred Berg’s analysis of the
NAACP is quite sympathetic, he still accuses the organization of ‘moral and intellectual hypocrisy’ in
not opposing the war. See Berg, ‘Guns, butter, and civil rights ’, p. 214.
11 ‘Sidetrack’, New York Post, 18 July 1965, Roy Wilkins papers, box 39, folder ‘Newspaper column
clippings, 1964–1965’, Library of Congress.
12 Charles DeBenedetti, An American ordeal : the antiwar movement of the Vietnam era, assisting author
Charles Chatﬁeld (Syracuse, 1990), p. 120; and ‘We declare peace: call for an assembly of un-
represented people in Washington, D.C., on August 6 through 9’, p. 1, papers of the Congress of
Racial Equality, 1944–68 (microﬁlm), reel 9, f 42, SHSW.
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organization’, requested that they heed his advice.13 When SNCC opposed the
war in January 1966, Wilkins made his disdain clear in his national newspaper
column. He pointed out that SNCC, which was a tiny group within the civil
rights movement and was fast losing inﬂuence, had adopted the oﬃcial leftist line
on Vietnam. Wilkins reassured his readers that the bulk of the movement did not
agree with SNCC’s militant statement.14 Indeed, Wilkins’s position on Vietnam
was shared by the rest of the moderate black movement, including Whitney
Young, A. Philip Randolph, and Bayard Rustin.
Martin Luther King’s blistering attack on the Vietnam War elicited a strong
response from the NAACP. On 10 April 1967, the organization’s national board
of directors passed a unanimous resolution declaring that any attempt to merge
the peace and civil rights movement was ‘a serious tactical mistake ’ and pledging
that the NAACP would ‘stick to the job for which it was organised’.15 Although
King was not mentioned by name, there was no doubting that he was the intended
target of the attack.16 A few days later, Wilkins wrote that although King had the
right to express his views on the war, he did not speak for the whole civil rights
movement.17 Then, in August 1967, Wilkins accused those black leaders who were
‘moaning about ’ the war of neglecting the ﬁght for civil rights at home and giving
too much attention to ‘Asia, Africa, and the islands of the sea ’.18 While some
NAACP members resented such attacks on King, only a handful protested or
resigned – though it is likely that a much larger number kept their grumblings to
themselves.19
Vietnam’s potential to break apart the NAACP was one reason why the
Association was so reluctant to take a position on the conﬂict, at least so long as
the majority of Americans supported the war. In January 1966, NAACP assistant
executive director John Morsell explained that his organization’s membership
comprised a ‘wide range of party loyalties and … opinions on a variety of
issues ’, there was unanimity only on the concern for racial justice.20 A couple of
months later Roy Wilkins asserted that the NAACP had no right to assume that
13 Report of the executive director for June, July, and August, 1965, 13 Sept. 1965, Papers of the
NAACP: supplement to part 1, 1961–1965, editorial advisor August Meier, ed. Mark Fox (Frederick, MD,
1982–97), reel 1, Cambridge University, England; and memo from Wilkins to branch and youth
council presidents re ‘Washington, D.C. Jamboree August 6–9, 1965’, 30 July 1965, NAACP papers,
group III box A328, folder ‘Vietnam War, 1964–1965’, Library of Congress.
14 Roy Wilkins, ‘SNCC’s foreign policy’, 16 Jan. 1966, in Roy Wilkins papers, box 39, folder
‘Newspaper column clippings, 1966’, Library of Congress.
15 David J. Garrow, Bearing the cross : Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference (London, 1993), p. 555; and Berg, ‘Guns, butter, and civil rights ’, p. 223.
16 Garrow, Bearing the cross, p. 555.
17 ‘Dr. King’s new role’, New York Post, 15 Apr. 1967, Roy Wilkins papers, box 39, folder
‘Newspaper column clippings 1967–1969’, Library of Congress.
18 Roy Wilkins, ‘LBJ’s programs would aid negro’, Detroit News, 26 Aug. 1967, oﬃce ﬁles of
Frederick Panzer, box 331, folder – civil rights 1967–8, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library,
Austin, Texas (LBJ). 19 Berg, ‘Guns, butter, and civil rights ’, p. 224.
20 Letter from John Morsell to Henry Wallace, 10 Jan. 1966, in NAACP papers, group IV box A86,
folder ‘Vietnam correspondence, 1966’, Library of Congress.
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members who had signed up for the civil rights ﬁght would ‘want their civil rights
organization to commit them to a stand on the Vietnamese War’.21
Certainly, moderate civil rights leaders feared that adopting an anti-war
position would both harm their own organizations and weaken support amongst
mainstream America for the black movement. However, the decision to take no
position on the war was the result of a number of factors. Manfred Berg has
argued that the NAACP’s reaction to the war was moulded by concepts of loyalty
and patriotism that had formed an essential part of the civil rights struggle for
decades, and rested upon the notion that a moderate, integrationist civil rights
organization could not aﬀord to oppose a war that was being fought in the
name of democracy.22 Indeed, opposing the war threatened to alienate many
patriotic African Americans, who understood that military service and loyalty had
previously served as an eﬀective tool for black advancement. However, this article
seeks to give greater emphasis to two other factors that Berg has discussed in his
work on the NAACP, though applying them to the moderates as a whole – the
personal and political closeness of moderate civil rights leaders to the Johnson
administration, and their anti-communism. More important, however, the re-
sponse of the moderates will be placed within a context of organizing experience.
I I I
The experiences of civil rights workers, who were active at the grass-roots
level with groups like SNCC and CORE during the early 1960s, led to many of
them becoming frustrated and disillusioned with the federal government, the
Democratic Party, and white liberals. The national government’s failure to pro-
tect civil rights activists from the violent assaults of segregationists was, perhaps,
the most important factor in radicalizing much of the direct action wing of the
black movement. In addition, the doomed attempt of the Mississippi Freedom
Democratic Party (MFDP) to win recognition at the 1964 Democratic National
Convention convinced many in SNCC that white liberal allies could not be
trusted, and that the Democratic Party was part of the problem, not part of
the solution. In January 1967, for example, Stokely Carmichael told a crowd in
Detroit that, while some called the Democratic Party the ‘ salvation of the Negro
people ’, it was actually ‘ the most treacherous enemy the Negro people have.
George and Lurleen Wallace run the Democratic Party in Alabama. As far as
I’m concerned, they’re bedfellows with … former Attorney General [Nicholas]
Katzenbach. ’23 Behind the hyperbole and rhetorical excess of the SNCC chair-
man lay genuine feelings of bitterness and disillusionment.
On the ground experience of grass-roots organizing frequently bred rad-
icalism and fostered disillusionment with the federal government and white
21 Letter from Roy Wilkins to Joseph Stern, 17 Mar. 1966, in NAACP papers, group IV box A86,
folder ‘Vietnam correspondence, 1966’, Library of Congress.
22 See Berg, ‘Guns, butter, and civil rights ’, p. 214.
23 ‘Carmichael assails Democrats, Liberals ’, Washington Post, 19 Jan. 1967.
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liberals –thereby increasing the likelihood of cynicism about the war or outright
opposition to it. Bob Moses, for example, believed that those who had been a part
of the Southern civil rights movement were best equipped to understand the
‘ sick ’ way in which America viewed the rest of the world.24 When SNCC released
its anti-war statement in January 1966 it explained that ‘our work, particularly in
the South, taught us that the United Sates government has never guaranteed the
freedom of oppressed citizens ’.25 In many ways, anti-war sentiment ﬂowed from
the organizing experience itself. As Howard Zinn explained in 1965, opposition
to the war among Southern black activists came ‘from the cotton ﬁelds, the
country roads, the jails of the Deep South, where these young people have spent
much of their time’.26
However, the experience of civil rights moderates was markedly diﬀerent.
For them, the Democratic Party – at the national level – had been a staunch
ally. It had passed the 1964 and 1965 civil rights acts, which destroyed the legal
basis for Jim Crow segregation and promised an end to African American dis-
franchisement in the South. In addition, the Great Society oﬀered the prospect of
helping to end the biting poverty that aﬄicted a disproportionately high number
of America’s black citizens. Not only did such achievements conﬁrm their belief
in the innate goodness of America ; it also convinced them that the future
for progressive change lay in alliance with liberal Democrats. The moderates’
position on Vietnam was, in many ways, a logical product of their previous
experience within the civil rights movement.
Moreover, the NAACP’s whole approach to solving the civil rights problem –
indeed its very analysis of the problem – diﬀered markedly to that of the more
radical groups. SNCC’s philosophy of organizing, for instance, was based on
participatory democracy, a faith in ordinary people ; and it aimed at building
local indigenous black insurgencies that would empower African Americans
throughout the South. But the attitude of Roy Wilkins toward the locally
orientated organizing strategy practised by SNCC was expressed clearly at
the Atlantic City Convention. Although nominally a supporter of the MFDP,
Wilkins’s personal commitment to the cause is subject to some doubt. In a tele-
phone conversation with Lyndon Johnson on 15 August 1964, he explained that
while he had to support the Freedom Party publicly, lest his position as a black
leader become untenable, he would ‘explore ways and means of blunting this
thing ’.27 At Atlantic City Wilkins favoured the compromise of giving the MFDP
two at-large seats and the promise of future reform, rather than recognizing them
24 ‘… One freedom worker’s views’, Southern Patriot, Oct. 1965, p. 3.
25 Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) statement on the war in Vietnam, 6 Jan.
1966, in Massimo Teodori, The new left : a documentary history (London, 1970), p. 251.
26 Howard Zinn, unpublished article, winter 1965, in Howard Zinn papers, box 3, folder 5, SHSW.
27 Telephone conversation between Roy Wilkins and Lyndon Johnson, 15 Aug. 1964, 9:50 a.m.,
recordings of conversations and meetings, recordings of telephone conversations – White House series,
tape WH6408.21, #4940 and #4941, LBJ.
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as the oﬃcial Mississippi delegation, believing that ensuring a Johnson victory
over Barry Goldwater – and having Hubert Humphrey as vice-president – were
issues that took precedence. Wilkins’s opinions of the indigenous black leadership
that SNCC had nurtured were somewhat unﬂattering. At the convention he told
Fannie Lou Hamer that ‘you people have put your point across. You don’t know
anything, you’re ignorant, you don’t know anything about politics. I been in the
business over twenty years … Now why don’t you pack up and go home?’28
The fundamental objective of the NAACP had always been the full partici-
pation of African Americans in all phases of American life.29 The leaders of
the NAACP were determined that nothing would deﬂect them from this goal.
Herbert Hill, a former labour secretary of the Association, who possessed what
one journalist described as a ‘deep, voice-of-doom delivery that can bounce oﬀ
walls in a Senate committee hearing room or hold a private audience of one in
shell-shocked thrall ’,30 recalled Roy Wilkins’s philosophy:
Our mission … our sacred mission … is to deal with, is the struggle for the rights of Blacks.
We must never compromise, we must be undeterred, we must never let anything get in our
way. Wilkins used to say ‘Steady as she goes. ’ Everything in the organization is integrity,
the NAACP, its leadership and membership must not be deﬂected by any other con-
siderations. That was Wilkins’ genuine feeling. So let King do whatever he wants, [ James]
Farmer can go, it’s OK, they’re ﬂashes in the pan. That’s the way he felt. They’re here
today, gone tomorrow. We will be here this year, next year and a hundred years from now.
As long as there’s racism in America, there will be an NAACP. And these others can go oﬀ,
but not the NAACP. We remain ﬁrm and, his favourite phrase, ‘Steady as she goes ’.31
Clearly, opposing the Vietnam War would have made the ship very unsteady.
Unlike the militants of SNCC, the NAACP did not advocate a revolutionary
overhaul of the American socio-economic and political system. The Brooklyn-
born Hill, a music buﬀ who was stimulated by the ‘dramatic struggles of labor
and eventually Negro labor ’, was one of the national NAACP’s most radical
oﬃcials. During the 1940s and 1950s he had embarked on an uncompromising
crusade against racism in the labour movement – Roy Wilkins recalled that Hill,
who was Jewish, ‘grabbed hold of Jim Crow in the AFL-CIO and squeezed
so hard you could hear George Meany’s splutters all the way to New York’.32
Hill explained that :
the leaders of the NAACP were, that’s in the past, the period we’re talking about, we’re
not radicals, we’re not revolutionary. I think for the most part we accepted the assump-
tions about American society, with the reservation that we ought to get rid of racial
28 Fannie Lou Hamer, 22 Nov. 1966, Ruleville, MS, interview by Howard Romaine quoted in Eric
Burner, And gently he shall lead them: Robert Parris Moses and civil rights in Mississippi (New York and London,
1994), p. 186. 29 Wilkins, Standing fast, p. 321.
30 Joseph Wershba, ‘Daily closeup: Herbert Hill, NAACP’s labor secretary’, New York Post,
14 Dec. 1959, p. 49. 31 Author’s interview with Herbert Hill, 16 May 2000.
32 See Wershba, ‘Daily closeup: Herbert Hill ’ ; Paula F. Pfeﬀer, A. Philip Randolph, pioneer of the civil
rights movement (Baton Rouge and London, 1990), pp. 226–32; and Wilkins, Standing fast, p. 221.
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discrimination. But they were not revolutionaries, they were not … radicals. They were
radicals on the subject of race, they were revolutionaries on the subject of race, but they
identiﬁed with this society.33
Now, for the ﬁrst time in American history, the national government also seemed
to be committed to the goal of eradicating racial discrimination and opening up
opportunities for African Americans. Speaking in 1969, Roy Wilkins summed
up his view of Lyndon Johnson:
he committed the White House and the Administration to the involvement of government
in getting rid of the inequalities between people solely on the basis of race. And he did this
to a greater extent than any other President in our history … when the chips were down he
used the great powers of the presidency on the side of the people who were deprived.34
In his autobiography, the NAACP executive director articulated his positive
experience of working closely with the Johnson government. Wilkins stated that
he often came away from conversations with LBJ ‘ feeling that he was not only
with us but often ahead of us ’.35 Wilkins explained how, in August of 1965, he had
met with the president and explained that only nine midshipmen at the US Naval
Academy in Annapolis were blacks. Johnson promised to get the secretary of
defence to investigate, and the problem was quickly rectiﬁed. Wilkins explained
that ‘ it was as easy as that in those years to do business with LBJ’.36 Wilkins
may have found things less easy had he been asking for federal protection in
Mississippi or adequate FBI investigations into racially motivated crimes. Never-
theless, for the national leadership of the NAACP and other civil rights moderates,
the national Democratic Party was, overwhelmingly, viewed as friend, not foe.
The civil rights achievements of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations
during the ﬁrst half of the 1960s represented the fulﬁlment of the NAACP’s dream
of achieving racial equality through legislation and government intervention –
there was little room for bitterness or disillusionment, and less motivation to view
the war in Vietnam as anything other than a necessary defence of freedom in the
face of communist aggression.
I V
In February 1965, Commentary magazine carried Bayard Rustin’s ‘From protest to
politics : the future of the civil rights movement ’. In it Rustin, one of the foremost
strategists of the civil rights movement, outlined his hopes and tactical approach
for the rest of the decade.37 Rustin claimed that the civil rights movement was
evolving from a protest movement into a fully ﬂedged social movement and that
the future of the black freedom struggle lay in a re-alignment of the Democratic
33 Author’s interview with Herbert Hill, 16 May 2000.
34 Transcript, RoyWilkins oral history interview I, 4 Jan. 1969, by Thomas H. Baker, internet copy,
LBJ, p. 14. 35 Wilkins, Standing fast, p. 321. 36 Ibid., p. 321.
37 Anderson, Bayard Rustin, p. 284.
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Party.38 Believing that the Johnson administration was determined to fulﬁl the
promise of the New Deal, Rustin argued that direct action be replaced with
politics. He declared that :
the future of the Negro struggle depends on whether the contradictions of this society can
be resolved by a coalition of progressive forces which becomes the eﬀective political majority
in the United States. I speak of the coalition which staged the March on Washington,
passed the Civil Rights Act, and laid the basis for the Johnson landslide – Negroes, trade
unionists, liberals, and religious groups.39
The idea that the civil rights movement should seek further gains in alliance with
the progressive wing of the Democratic Party was shared by Roy Wilkins,
A. Philip Randolph, and the National Urban League’s Whitney Young. Believing
that the war did not preclude domestic progress, they argued that it was possible
to have both guns and butter.40 Such a strategy in fact made forthright criticism
of the Vietnam War impossible. The moderates understood that breaking with,
or merely oﬀending, the president over Vietnam would have repercussions for the
Great Society programmes. This was recognized byWhitney Young when he told
Martin Luther King that ‘ Johnson needs a consensus … If we are not with him
on Vietnam, then he is not going to be with us on civil rights. ’41 Anti-war critics
like Staughton Lynd believed that Rustin’s strategy of working with the Demo-
cratic Party required the implicit acceptance of the government’s war policy.42
Lynd, for example, infamously accused Rustin of advocating coalition with the
marines.43
Rustin’s attitude appears odd given his history as a paciﬁst and his early
opposition to the war in Vietnam – he had, for example, given a speech at a 1965
anti-Vietnam rally at New York’s Madison Square Garden, organized by the
National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE).44 In part it reﬂected his
belief in the coalition strategy, but it also derived from his uneasiness with the
anti-war movement itself. Rustin viewed the anti-war movement as being more
anti-American than anti-war, and he was especially concerned by its romantic-
ization of the Viet Cong. Rustin explained his views in a 1967 letter to the New York
Times in which he stated that no ‘eﬀective ’ and ‘enduring’ peace movement
could be built, or win inﬂuence with the American people, if it became publicly
identiﬁed with groups that desired a victory for the Viet Cong.45
38 Bayard Rustin, ‘From protest to politics : the future of the civil rights movement’, Commentary
(Feb. 1965), quoted in Rustin, Down the line, p. 115. 39 Ibid., p. 119.
40 Cook, Sweet land of liberty?, p. 181; and Berg, ‘Guns, butter, and civil rights ’, p. 225.
41 Weiss, Whitney M. Young, Jr., p. 158. 42 Anderson, Bayard Rustin, p. 296.
43 Staughton Lynd, ‘Coalition politics or nonviolent revolution? ’, Liberation ( June–July 1965), p. 18.
44 Anderson, Bayard Rustin, pp. 291–2.
45 Ibid., pp. 293 and 298. Rustin’s dedication to the realignment of the Democratic Party played a
role in his somewhat conservative stance with regard to the peace movement. It is also widely ru-
moured that Rustin began to work for the CIA. John D’Emilio, however, has placed Rustin’s criticisms
of the peace movement, and his more general move away from the political left, within the context of
his homosexuality. Indeed, he goes so far as to claim that Rustin’s political odyssey is a ‘ tale of gay
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Asa Philip Randolph, the veteran civil rights leader and founder of the ﬁrst
all-black labour union – the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters – agreed with
Rustin’s strategy of coalition politics ; like Rustin, his own position on the war was
ambiguous. Randolph, whose militant anti-communism was rooted in the ideo-
logical battles that took place within the Socialist Party shortly after the Bolshevik
Revolution, was a pragmatic paciﬁst who had opposed the First World War and,
through his March on Washington Movement, had threatened massive civil dis-
obedience during the war against Nazism.46 He was an early critic of the Vietnam
War – at a demonstration in New York City on 19 December 1964, for example,
he ‘pilloried America’s foreign policy ’ ; he had signed the ‘Declaration of Con-
science’ against the war in Vietnam; and at the December 1965 AFL-CIO con-
vention in San Francisco he warned that America’s poor were bearing the burden
of the war and that the conﬂict was being used as an excuse to stall on civil rights.47
Randolph had been prepared to rock the boat during the Second World War
and, given his early opposition to Vietnam, he might have been expected to do
the same in the late 1960s. But instead he sided with the no position adherents,
and adopted the same line as the NAACP. The veteran black leader agreed with
Bayard Rustin that co-operation with white allies and the federal government was
the ‘only feasible way of delivering power to an essentially powerless people ’, and
this commitment to the strategy of coalition politics would prevent him from
becoming an outspoken critic of Vietnam.48 Randolph, described by Roy Wilkins
as the ‘ spiritual and historical father ’ of the Vietnam-era draft resisters, down-
played his personal opposition to America’s use of military force in Southeast Asia
and argued that it was ‘ tactically unsound’ for a ‘civil rights leader or a leader of
the peace movement to attempt to assume a position of leadership in both … at
the same time. ’49 Randolph also disagreed with attempts to involve the civil rights
oppression’. D’Emilio argues that being stigmatized as a ‘sex pervert ’ had helped Rustin to lose any
attachment to ‘ left-wing romanticism’. He was thus critical of the peace movement’s tendency toward
radical posturing and third world romanticism and ‘grasped the bankruptcy of radical marginality
in a way that few of his peers did’. Rustin’s homosexuality also resulted in him lacking an insti-
tutional base – Martin Luther King, for example, decided against bringing Rustin on to the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) staﬀ because of concerns over his sexuality. This lack of
organizational roots, according to D’Emilio, made Rustin vulnerable to overtures from conservative
organizations. Rustin eventually agreed to head the A. Philip Randolph Institute which, being funded
by the AFL-CIO, greatly restricted his room for dissent. However, whilst D’Emilio’s thesis is in-
triguing, it does not deal with the fact that many heterosexual radicals have suﬀered similar political
conversions. See John D’Emilio, ‘Homophobia and the trajectory of postwar American radicalism:
the career of Bayard Rustin’, Radical History Review, 62 (1995).
46 See Pfeﬀer, A. Philip Randolph, pp. 17–18, 21 and 43.
47 See DeBenedetti, An American ordeal, pp. 85 and 100; and Philip S. Foner, American labor and the
Indochina war : the growth of union opposition (New York, 1971), pp. 30–2.
48 Cook, Sweet land of liberty ?, p. 205.
49 Pfeﬀer, A. Philip Randolph, p. 149; undated paper, the papers of A. Philip Randolph, ed. John H.
Bracey, Jr, and August Meier (microﬁlm project of University Publications of America, 1990), reel 32,
speeches and writings ﬁle, box 41, ‘Research notes and related material, undated, 196pp. ’, Sterling
Memorial Library, Yale University (SML). See also Pfeﬀer, A. Philip Randolph, p. 278.
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movement in anti-war actions. He explained this position in some detail in the fall
of 1966:
May I say that I have expressed my opinion to civil rights leaders to the eﬀect that it
would be unfair to the Negro masses for the civil rights leaders to abandon the Mississippi-
Alabama front and leave it exposed to the racists of the George Wallace stripe, and turn the
Negro’s attention and plunge him into participation in demonstrations to end the war in
Vietnam. Having long experience in the ﬁeld of mass movements, I am aware that you
cannot ﬁght on two fronts at the same time without sacriﬁcing one.50
Randolph wrote that, while he was personally committed to seeing the war end
‘at the earliest possible moment ’, the leadership of the civil rights movement had
‘no mandate from the Negro masses … to carry on any broad, massive movement
to end the war in Vietnam’.51 Like Rustin, Randolph was uneasy with the radical
elements of the peace movement – he was, for example, ‘unequivocally opposed
to burning of draft cards and especially to … burning the ﬂag of our country ’.52
On occasion Randolph appears to have indicated a measure of support for the
war. In the spring of 1965 he wired LBJ, expressing approval of the president’s
7 April Johns Hopkins address at which, in addition to re-aﬃrming America’s
commitment to an independent South Vietnam, he had also stated his willingness
to participate in ‘unconditional discussions ’ with any government to try and end
the war, and had outlined an ambitious $1 billion development programme for
the Mekong River Valley. Johnson expressed gratitude for this ‘most welcome’
support.53 However, Randolph continued to harbour private doubts. On May 20
Norman Thomas wrote, expressing his opposition to America’s recent military
interference in the Dominican Republic. He declared that he was ‘ thoroughly
convinced that what the U.S. is doing in the Dominican Republic and, I may
add, Vietnam is doing more for communism than communism could do for
itself ’. Randolph replied the next day with a telegram in which he stated ‘I agree
with you. ’54 But while Randolph wanted to ‘see the United States stop the
bombing … and disengage its military forces from involvement in South East
Asia at the earliest possible date ’, he did not support a unilateral withdrawal, nor
did he ‘place all the blame for the continuance of the war on the United States ’.
Indeed, Randolph evidently believed that President Johnson was attempting to
secure a just peace in Vietnam.55
50 Letter, A. Philip Randolph to Jerome Davis, 14 Sept. 1966, in papers of A. Philip Randolph,
reel 2, general correspondence, box 2, ‘A–Y, 1966’ (SML). 51 Ibid.
52 Undated paper, papers of A. Philip Randolph, reel 32, speeches and writings ﬁle, box 41,
‘Research notes and related material, undated, 196pp. ’ (SML).
53 Garrow, Bearing the cross, p. 553; Pfeﬀer, A. Philip Randolph, p. 278; and DeBenedetti, An American
ordeal, pp. 108 and 110. See letter from Lyndon Johnson to A. Philip Randolph, 15 Apr. 1965, in papers
of A. Philip Randolph, reel 2, general correspondence, box 2, ‘A–W, 1965’ (SML).
54 Letter, Norman Thomas to A. Philip Randolph, 20 May 1965, and telegram, Randolph to
Thomas, 21 May 1965, in papers of A. Philip Randolph, reel 2, general correspondence, box 2, ‘A–W,
1965’ (SML). Randolph did not refer to Thomas’s comments about Vietnam.
55 Undated paper, papers of A. Philip Randolph, reel 32, speeches and writings ﬁle, box 41,
‘Research notes and related material, undated, 196pp. ’ (SML).
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By the decade’s end, Randolph applied a selective reading of his own actions
when he explained that :
I have always been opposed to wars in principle … Vietnam … represents … no defense
of our vital national interest. The moral commitment of the American government went
beyond the reaches of liberal concern for our own problems, in the sense that it committed
an enormous and costly amount of the nation’s resources to Vietnam – in terms of both
money and human life. This, as I see it, is a great moral loss and a weakening of the
country’s moral ﬁber. As for Dr. King’s decision to oppose the war, I cannot say I regard it
as any great moral contradiction. He was, after all, one of the moral leaders of the country.
Opposing wars and ﬁghting for civil rights have natural and complementary motivations.
And long before Dr. King came along, the Messenger, which I edited in World War I, was
ﬁghting for civil rights and opposing the war at the same time.56
In fact, during the mid-1960s, Randolph believed that opposing the war was not a
vital concern to the black freedom struggle ; he feared that the peace movement
would divert energy from the civil rights movement ; and he held that the freedom
movement had much to lose and little to gain by breaking with the Johnson
administration in order to criticize the war in Vietnam.57 One does, though, get a
strong sense of the private horror with which Randolph, along with Wilkins and
Rustin, must have viewed developments in Southeast Asia. Just at the moment
when the forces of progressivism seemed poised to triumph, the war in Vietnam
threatened everything. Randolph encapsulated the tragedy of 1960s liberalism
when he wrote that ‘ the Vietnam War … has practically pushed the civil rights
movement oﬀ the center of the stage of American history ’. Whilst the ‘white
liberals and students ’ were ‘ still for civil rights ’, they were now ‘asking for peace
in Vietnam, not for civil rights in Alabama and Mississippi ’.58
The Urban League’s stance on Vietnam in many ways mirrored that of the
NAACP, Randolph, and Rustin – it insisted that foreign policy and civil rights
issues remain disconnected. As early as August 1965, the League’s Delegate
Assembly had approved a resolution recommending that the organization stay
out of the burgeoning Vietnam controversy. The resolution called on the NUL to
‘not divide nor divert its energies and resources by seeking to merge domestic
and international issues where armed conﬂict is involved’.59 The Urban League,
which attempted to increase black economic opportunities by using the tactics
of persuasion and negotiation in American boardrooms to sell civil rights to
powerful whites, had a somewhat restrained and cautious agenda. The League
had joined the civil rights movement thanks to the eﬀorts of its executive director,
Whitney M. Young, Jr, and, of the ‘big ﬁve’ organizations, it was the one least
56 Jervis Anderson, A. Philip Randolph : a biographical portrait (New York, 1972), p. 331 ; and Anderson,
Bayard Rustin, p. 301. 57 Pfeﬀer, A. Philip Randolph, p. 278.
58 Undated paper, papers of A. Philip Randolph, reel 32, speeches and writings ﬁle, box 41,
‘Research notes and related material, undated, 196pp. ’ (SML).
59 Report from the New York Times, 3 Aug. 1965, C.P. 16, in Howard Zinn papers, 1956–94
(processed), box 3, folder 5, SHSW.
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inﬂuenced by grass-roots pressure and most easily controlled by its national
leadership. Young himself travelled to Vietnam in July 1966 on an independent
fact-ﬁnding mission ﬁnanced by the League, where he investigated the welfare
of black troops ﬁghting there. The NUL leader expressed pride in eﬀorts of the
black soldiers, whom he claimed had high morale and he emphasized interracial
co-operation within the US armed forces, although he also drew attention to the
lack of African American oﬃcers. Still, Young was careful to explain that he was
not making any judgement on the conﬂict itself.60 It was a point that he made
again in August, speaking on Meet the Press, when he stated that ‘ the Urban
League takes no position on Vietnam. We know this, that we had a race problem
in this country before Vietnam; we will have a race problem after it is gone. ’61
He insisted that the civil rights movement focus on ‘rats tonight and jobs
tomorrow’.62 Indeed Whitney Young disagreed vehemently with Martin Luther
King’s opposition to the war, and the two famously traded personal insults in
March 1967.63
V
The coalition strategy was cemented by the close personal relationship that
Roy Wilkins and Whitney Young enjoyed with Lyndon Johnson. James Farmer
recalled that LBJ ‘adored ’ Whitney Young, and he became, along with Wilkins, a
major adviser on White House civil rights initiatives.64 Dennis C. Dickerson has
claimed that Young had ‘ insider status ’ during the Johnson years, and that he
was consulted extensively about the war on poverty and other Great Society
programmes.65 Whitney Young’s role as the ‘ inside man’ of the black revolution,
a ﬁgure who ‘served as a bridge and interpreter between black America and the
businessmen, foundation executives, and public oﬃcials who comprised the white
power structure ’, and his relationship with LBJ, helped to shape his response to
the Vietnam War.66
As well as sharing a political philosophy with the liberal leadership of the
Democratic Party during the early 1960s, Roy Wilkins also enjoyed an extra-
ordinarily close relationship with the 36th president of the United States. Inter-
viewed in 1969, Wilkins confessed that he had great aﬀection and admiration
for Johnson.67 In his autobiography, Wilkins recalled his reaction to Johnson’s
message to Congress in support of voting rights legislation in March 1965 – ‘I had
waited all my life to hear a President of the United States talk that way. There was
a great roar of applause. I looked to my left and I looked to my right and I saw
60 Dennis C. Dickerson, Militant mediator : Whitney M. Young, Jr. (Lexington, KY, 1998), pp. 271–3.
61 Weiss, Whitney M. Young, Jr., p. 158. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid., pp. 158–9.
64 Dickerson, Militant mediator, p. 247. 65 Ibid., p. 257.
66 Weiss, Whitney M. Young, Jr., p. xi ; and Dickerson, Militant mediator, p. 270.
67 Transcript, RoyWilkins oral history interview I, 4 Jan. 1969, by Thomas H. Baker, internet copy,
LBJ, p. 14.
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men and women with their eyes full of tears. And at that moment, I confess,
I loved LBJ. ’68
Lyndon Johnson certainly appears to have valued Roy Wilkins’s friendship,
and he shamelessly ﬂattered the civil rights leader, frequently buttering up
Wilkins in the oﬃcial correspondence between the two men. In February 1966
he wrote to Wilkins, stating that he had ‘always been a man on whom I could
depend, regardless of the winds of change’.69 In September 1968 the president,
whose capacity to ﬂatter knew no bounds, told the NAACP head that he could
call him any time he needed to – ‘I am always proud and grateful to have you
by my side. ’70 In the ﬁnal days of his presidency, Johnson wrote to Wilkins, once
again conveying great aﬀection – ‘[your name] will live … in my memory, where
I will be grateful forever for the wise counsel, the unfailing generosity, and the
selﬂess friendship you gave me throughout my Presidency. I hope we see each
other often in the years ahead, Roy. God bless you. ’71
To a certain degree, the federal government appears actively to have
courted the civil rights movement’s more moderate leaders after 1965. Indeed,
a memorandum from George Reedy, LBJs press secretary, to the president in
the autumn of 1965 declared that moderate civil rights leaders would be the
most eﬀective at consolidating the civil rights gains already made, and suggested
that :
the Federal Government would be well advised to make a public point of consulting
Randolph, Wilkins, and Young (particularly Wilkins) in the period immediately ahead.
Frequent invitations to the White House would be in order and anything that could be
done to increase his prestige would help to shift the focus from demonstrations in the streets
to the type of constructive work that now is so badly needed.72
The federal government certainly cultivated Wilkins’s support, but there can be
little doubt that Wilkins and Johnson, besides sharing many of the same political
goals, also developed a very close personal relationship. The NAACP executive
director constantly received phone calls from Johnson, and Wilkins and his wife
were regular guests for barbecue at Johnson’s Texas ranch.73 NAACP labour
secretary Herbert Hill recalled ‘I don’t think in the entire history of the NAACP
the President of the United States had evolved such a close personal relationship
with the head of the [Association]. ’74 This clearly was yet another reason why the
NAACP refused to take a stand against the Vietnam War, especially considering
68 Wilkins, Standing fast, p. 307.
69 White House central ﬁle (WHCF) name ﬁle – Roy Wilkins, 24 Feb. 1966, LBJ to Wilkins, LBJ.
70 WHCF name ﬁle – Roy Wilkins, 5 Sept. 1968, LBJ to Wilkins, LBJ.
71 WHCF name ﬁle – Roy Wilkins, 17 Jan. 1969, LBJ to Wilkins, LBJ.
72 Oﬃce ﬁles of Lee C. White, box 4, folder – civil rights – list of organizations and political leaders,
memo from George Reedy to LBJ, 7 Sept. 1965, LBJ.
73 Author’s interview with Herbert Hill, 16 May 2000, and 9 Aug. 2000.
74 Author’s interview with Herbert Hill, 16 May 2000.
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the very personal attacks that many anti-war movement participants made on the
president.75
The combination of the coalition strategy and personal aﬀection for LBJ made
criticism of the war in Vietnam a virtual impossibility. The only way in which the
moderate wing of the civil rights movement oﬃcially interacted with the war was
in using the conﬂict to advance the Great Society. For example, early in 1967
Whitney Young claimed that white liberals were using Vietnam as an excuse for
their failure to support civil rights. In reference to northern housing drives he
stated that ‘when we began to talk about issues that involved them next door in
their communities they suddenly decided there was a more important issue ’ –
Vietnam. Young concluded ‘we are insisting that this country ﬁght a war on
poverty, and had better ﬁght a war on poverty, with the same tenacity as in
Vietnam’.76 At the end of June 1967, shortly after the House of Representatives
had voted by 232 to 171 to reject a $10 million appropriation to extend a rent
supplement programme, Whitney Young commented that : ‘ It is tragic that when
the front pages are ﬁlled with pictures and stories of the courage of Negro soldiers
dying in Viet Nam in disproportionate numbers that the Congress should see ﬁt
to reward their impoverished loved ones back home in the ghetto by cruelly
cutting out any additional funds for rent supplements. ’77 Using the Vietnam War
for the purpose of advancing a progressive domestic agenda had been adopted as
oﬃcial policy by the Council of United Civil Rights Leadership (a co-ordinating
body set up in 1963 to raise money and encourage co-operation among civil
rights groups) in March 1966.78 Believing that the Republic could aﬀord both
guns and butter, moderate civil rights leaders sought to apply pressure on an often
recalcitrant Congress by using African American service in a foreign war as a
bargaining chip. This was in the tradition of the Double V strategy that had been
employed so successfully during the Second World War, and it reﬂected the
traditional way in which black America had attempted to use service for one’s
country as leverage. The ﬂaw in the strategy by the late 1960s, however, was that
there was virtually no leverage left – legal equality had recently been assured ;
the Great Society was already under serious political assault ; and the forces of
conservatism were preparing to reap the harvest of the white backlash. Some civil
75 The anti-war chant ‘Hey, hey LBJ, how many kids did you kill today’, is well known. One of the
most notorious anti-war attacks on the president came from SNCC’s Julius Lester who, in an article for
the SNCC newsletter – later reprinted in the February 1968 edition of the New South Student –advocated
militant resistance to the war – ‘To resist is to make the President afraid to leave the White House
because he will be spat upon wherever he goes to tell his lies, because his limousine will ﬁnd the streets
ﬁlled with tacks and thousands of people who will surge around it, smashing the windows and rocking
the car until it is turned on its side. Have we forgotten? The man is a murderer. ’ See Julius Lester,
‘To hell with protest ’, New South Student, 5 (1968).
76 ‘Vietnam called ‘‘excuse’’ for lag in rights ﬁght ’, Washington Post, 21 Jan. 1967, in oﬃce ﬁles of
Frederick Panzer, box 331, folder – civil rights 1967–8, LBJ.
77 National Urban League (NUL) newsletter – Washington Bureau, vol. 1 no. 4 (30 June 1967), p. 3.
78 Minutes, Council of United Civil Rights Leadership, 23 Mar. 1966, NY. Copy in possession of
author.
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rights leaders understood this, even as they held ﬁrm to the strategy. In February
1968, Gloster Current, NAACP director of branches, explained that because of
America’s growing involvement in Vietnam, ‘a wave of reaction has swept the
land and it is not as easy to get progressive legislation passed. ’79
V I
The close relationship between the moderate civil rights movement and the
federal government was certainly a cause of concern among some of the rank-
and-ﬁle. One report of the 1965 NAACP convention in Denver claimed that
‘opposition that ﬂared from the ﬂoor … mirrored objections that the leadership
was too closely tied with the Johnson Administration’.80 While the NAACP was
able to contain dissent over Vietnam, it was forced to take a stronger position
against the nomination of former Mississippi Governor James Coleman to a
federal judgeship.81 The initial, mild resolution prompted claims from the ﬂoor
that a deal had been struck with Johnson, and Wilkins was forced to deny that he
had been oﬀered a cabinet position. It was an incident that the NAACP’s Herbert
Hill remembered clearly some thirty-ﬁve years later :
there was a rumour that Wilkins was selling out the NAACP and Johnson was going to
make him an American Ambassador to the Court of St James … or was going to give him
some high … post. Roy had to get up at the Convention and deny that, and say that if
Johnson … no matter what Johnson oﬀered him, he would not take it … I mean the fact
that the head of the organization has to get up, and he makes a spontaneous, unwritten,
entirely improvised point, in which he says that he’s personally hurt, personally angered …
I was on the platform at the time, right there … that there should even be … that this was
even regarded as a possibility. It was outrageous, given his years and years, his decades of
working for the organization, his whole life … and I remember this very clearly, just as if it
happened yesterday, that if he were oﬀered a very high … he would not take it. ‘My life is
with the NAACP’ he says ‘I will be here until God has other plans for me’, something, he
makes the statement to the eﬀect that til the Lord has other plans for me, I will be here.
Now the fact that that has to happen.82
Gloster Current recalled that an attorney from Flint, Michigan (the ﬁrst NAACP
branch to oppose the war), had given Wilkins and Washington lobbyist Clarence
Mitchell a hard time by claiming that they had ‘sold out ’ to the administration.83
79 Letter, Gloster Current to Mr Locksley Edmondson, 20 Feb. 1968, in NAACP papers, group IV,
box C58, folder ‘E’, Library of Congress.
80 William A. Price, ‘NAACP and CORE reassess their goals ’, National Guardian (New York), 17 July
1965, p. 3. 81 Ibid.
82 Author’s interview with Herbert Hill, 16 May 2000.
83 Memo from Current to Roy Wilkins, Stephen Spottswood, John Morsell, Clarence Mitchell, and
Henry Moon, 14 Apr. 1966, NAACP papers, group IV box A87, folder ‘Vietnam NAACP, 1966–1967’,
Library of Congress.
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Henry Wallace, an NAACP member from Kentucky, also accused the organ-
ization of being too intimate with the Johnson administration. After the Associ-
ation condemned SNCC’s anti-war statement of January 1966, Wallace wrote,
‘ the NAACP is fast becoming the leading Uncle Tom of the civil rights move-
ment. You are jumping through President Johnson’s hoop so regularly and
humiliatingly that you have become little more than an Administration house-
boy. ’84 A few days later he wrote again to John Morsell, claiming that through its
silence and its actions, the NAACP stood ‘with the Johnson crowd in the current
Vietnam policy. ’85 In May 1967, Gloster Current attended a meeting of
New York branches that opposed many of the NAACP’s national policies.
While one of their major grievances was the Association’s refusal to oppose the
war in Vietnam, there was also a ‘concentrated attack upon the organization
for its ‘‘ support of the Johnson Administration’’ ’. Current came away from this
meeting so concerned that he suggested the NAACP consider supporting
Muhammad Ali’s ﬁght against the draft, since he seemed ‘genuinely to be a
paciﬁst. This certainly would be as consistent as our supporting [Adam Clayton]
Powell and might confuse some who believe we are growing conservative. ’86 Eugene T. Reed,
a Brooklyn-born dentist and staunch Catholic, and national board member
Jack E. Tanner, perennial critics of Roy Wilkins’s leadership, also alleged that
the Association was too attached to Lyndon Johnson. Reed claimed that the
NAACP was ‘ in the pocket ’ of LBJ, whilst Tanner charged that the 1966 annual
convention had been ‘LBJ controlled ’.87
Scholars might dismiss these criticisms as the prejudices held by those who
opposed Roy Wilkins, and had personal axes to grind. It is, therefore, extremely
signiﬁcant that senior ﬁgures within the national staﬀ of the Association appear to
have shared some of the concern over the organization’s relationship with the
Johnson administration. In the spring of 1966, during an NAACP staﬀ meeting,
Gloster Current accused Wilkins of being too close to LBJ. Wilkins, unsurpris-
ingly, took great oﬀence: ‘ I consider your remark yesterday in the staﬀ meeting to
have been gratuitously insulting, with no substantive basis. In fact, you oﬀered
no citation, instance or other proof that your charge that my ‘‘closeness ’’ to the
Johnson Administration was one of the reasons for the decline in membership in
the NAACP. ’88 The executive director denied any closeness to the administration,
84 Henry Wallace to John Morsell, 13 Jan. 1966, in NAACP papers, group IV box A86, folder
‘Vietnam correspondence, 1966’, Library of Congress.
85 Henry Wallace to John Morsell, 17 January 1966, in NAACP papers, group IV box A86, folder
‘Vietnam Correspondence, 1966’, Library of Congress.
86 Memorandum from Gloster Current to Roy Wilkins, 1 May 1967, p. 14, in NAACP papers,
group IV box C24, folder ‘Greenwich Village–Chelsea, NY, 1966–1967’, Library of Congress.
My emphasis.
87 See Cook, Sweet land of liberty?, p. 206; and ‘Use black power, says NAACP head’, Yakima Herald,
13 July 1966, in NAACP papers, group IV box A11, folder ‘Board of directors, Tanner, Jack E,
1966–1968’, Library of Congress.
88 Memorandum from Roy Wilkins to Gloster Current, 3 Mar. 1966, in Roy Wilkins papers, box 7,
‘General correspondence, 1966’, Library of Congress.
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stated that no such claim had ever been made before in a staﬀ meeting, and
demanded that Current either provide evidence to support his accusation or oﬀer
an apology. Remarkably, Current’s apology appears to have fallen short of a full
retraction. The director of branches stated that he was sure that because the staﬀ
members knew him so well, they would not believe that he would be ‘deliberately
insulting to one who is doing so much for our common cause ’. Current admitted
that his remarks had been ‘tactless ’ and gave an impression that ‘would be dif-
ﬁcult to substantiate ’.89 Nevertheless, one is left with the distinct impression that
there was considerable concern within the NAACP that the organization was
tying itself too tightly to the Johnson administration.
V I I
A further reason for the moderate civil rights movement’s refusal to condemn the
VietnamWar prior to 1969 was anti-communism. In the early post-war period, as
the chill winds of the Cold War began to blow across America, the NAACP had
embraced the principal foreign and domestic tenets of anti-communist liberalism.
During the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Association tempered its criticisms of
colonialism; adopted policies designed to exclude communists or fellow travellers
from the organization; and equated criticism of American foreign policy with
pro-communism.90 Indeed, not only did the NAACP support American eﬀorts to
‘halt Communist aggression’ in Korea,91 the organization also attacked the
domestic peace movement :
we warn our branches and youth councils against so-called ‘peace ’ organizations that have
in the forefront of their program the demand to ‘bring back our boys from Korea. ’ Such
peace organizations are not only urging a policy desired by the communist bloc of nations,
but one likely to cause more and bigger wars throughout the world by making aggression in
Korea successful.92
The NAACP’s reaction to the Vietnam War and the peace movement that it
spawned would be shaped by, and would reﬂect, the anti-communist liberalism
that the organization had adopted during the late 1940s. The NAACP leadership,
along with the majority of Americans, would prove incapable of conceiving
89 Memorandum from Gloster Current to Roy Wilkins, 3 Mar. 1966, in Roy Wilkins papers, box 7,
‘General correspondence, 1966’, Library of Congress.
90 See ‘NAACP stand on colonialism and U.S. foreign policy’, Crisis, 62 no. 1 ( Jan. 1955), p. 23;
Charles W. Cheng, ‘The Cold War: its impact on the black liberation struggle within the United
States ’, Freedomways : A Quarterly Review of the Freedom Movement, 13 no. 3 (1973), pp. 196–7. At the 1950
NAACP annual convention, the Association passed a resolution against communist inﬁltration – see
Berg, ‘Guns, butter, and civil rights ’, p. 215; Adam Fairclough, ‘Race and red-baiting’, in Jack E.
Davis, ed., The civil rights movement (Malden, MA, and Oxford, 2001), p. 98; and Gerald Horne, Black
and red : W. E. B. Du Bois and the Afro-American response to the Cold War, 1944–1963 (Albany, NY, 1986),
pp. 50–6.
91 NAACP board meeting, 13 Nov. 1950, quoted in Horne, Black and red, p. 129.
92 Quoted in ‘NAACP stand on colonialism and U.S. foreign policy’, Crisis, 62 no. 1 ( Jan. 1955),
p. 25.
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that the anti-Vietnam War movement could be anything other than communist-
inﬂuenced.
In April 1965, the Flint, Michigan, branch of the NAACP became the ﬁrst to
engage with the Vietnam War when it passed a resolution urging a withdrawal of
American troops.93 Although the national oﬃce acted quickly to stiﬂe this protest,
the Association’s leadership interpreted such signs of dissent as the product of an
organized left-wing insurgency.94 Gloster Current, NAACP director of branches
and a staunch anti-communist, wrote that the ‘ left-wing … is having a ﬁeld day!
Its most recent project is to create problems over our country’s Vietnam policy. ’
He cited Flint as a case in point, and warned that the Association had to take
decisive action to prevent local branches getting involved in ‘ left-wing shenani-
gans ’.95 Current, who had been active in the Detroit branch of the NAACP
before being promoted to the national oﬃce in 1946, presided over the func-
tioning of the organization’s 1,400 branches. The Methodist and former jazz
musician was, according to colleague Herbert Hill, ‘ the bureaucrat incarnate ’
(he had received a master’s degree in public administration from Wayne State
University) and he guarded his NAACP turf resiliently. James Farmer, who
served brieﬂy as the Association’s activities co-ordinator, recalled Current telling
him that ‘I co-ordinate the activities of our branches, and I am the director of
their programs. ’ The director of branches was a committed anti-communist
who remained suspicious of the more radical wing of the freedom struggle. In
February 1968, for example, he referred to Stokely Carmichael and H. Rap
Brown as ‘nuts ’ and declared that ‘ it would really be worth our while if we could
squelch these do-nothing negativists … because they are standing in the way of
progress ’.96 Herbert Hill believes that Current’s zealous anti-communism was
largely the result of his bureaucratic mind-set. Current, whom Hill describes as
a ‘wonderful human being’ but ‘not very politically sophisticated’, viewed the
Communists as a threat to the organization – they were an alien force who were
not loyal to the NAACP. The director of branches merely responded to protect
the Association. Hill claims that Current would have done the same if the
‘Episcopalian Church were coming in’ – ‘his job was to protect the internal
integrity of the NAACP. He wasn’t going to let anybody gain control of the
branches … he did what he thought he had to do. ’97
The NAACP leadership was concerned that attempts would be made at the
1965 annual convention to get the organization involved with anti-war protests.
Such attempts were viewed as the work of a left-wing conspiracy. Current
93 Berg, ‘Guns, butter, and civil rights ’, p. 215.
94 NAACP papers, group III box A328, folder ‘Vietnam War, 1964–1965’, Library of Congress.
95 Memo from Gloster Current to NAACP staﬀ, 22 Apr. 1965, NAACP papers, group III box A328,
folder ‘VietnamWar, 1964–1965’, Library of Congress. See also Berg, ‘Guns, butter, and civil rights ’,
p. 215.
96 Letter, Gloster Current to Locksley Edmondson, 20 Feb. 1968, in NAACP papers, group IV box
C58, folder ‘E’, Library of Congress.
97 Author’s interview with Herbert Hill, 9 Aug. 2000.
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explained that ‘we certainly will have left-wingers raising issues in the Resolutions
Committee’, although he also recognized that ‘ there are many others who
are not left-wingers, but who have genuine reservations about Vietnam and
the Dominican Republic ’. Current suggested that key staﬀ members should
get together to take advance action to strengthen control over convention
proceedings.98
The following year the NAACP leadership again worried about what they
viewed as an organized left-wing insurgency designed to cause problems at the
Los Angeles convention over Vietnam. Current explained that :
While we have successfully evaded tying civil rights to the peace issue, there is evidence that
the left wing is at work to inﬂuence our resolutions to be adopted in Los Angeles … The
left wing is coming out of the woodwork, and the Vietnam issue could well be the biggest
problem we will be confronted with in Los Angeles.99
Current’s obsession with communism also coloured his interpretation of the
Spring Mobilization in April 1967. He attended the massive demonstration in
New York City where he heard black leaders including Stokely Carmichael,
Floyd McKissick, and Martin Luther King attack the Vietnam War. Current
concluded that ‘ the entire performance was reminiscent of the 30s when the
commies harangued a crowd with certain well-chosen speakers ’. He also warned
the NAACP national staﬀ that :
Whether we wish to acknowledge it or not, we have a resurgence of the left such as we have
not had since World War II. NAACP branches are going to be invaded and urged to get
aboard the peace movement …We need to mount an oﬀensive to give the American
people the facts and to urge youth and Negroes in the communities to pay no attention to
the fools. There ought to be an oﬀ-the-record meeting of the Negro press and key well
chosen Negro leaders to decide how to deal with what seems to be in the oﬃng.100
Fears that Vietnam might wreak havoc within the Association persisted. Current
added a new set of miscreants to his cast of villains when he informed the national
staﬀ that they should be prepared for the eﬀorts of ‘peace-niks, militants
and … odd balls ’, as well as leftists, to ruin the 1967 convention.101 He warned
branch oﬃcials to keep their eyes open for people stirring dissent and to report
them to the national staﬀ. Current also asked the branch oﬃcers to ‘urge
delegates not to be taken in by those who would seek to turn the NAACP into
another extremist organization’.102
98 Gloster Current memo to Roy Wilkins, John Morsell, Clarence Mitchell and Henry Moon,
14 May 1965, in NAACP papers, group III box A20, folder ‘1965 resolutions’, Library of Congress.
99 Memo from Current to Roy Wilkins, Stephen Spottswood, John Morsell, Clarence Mitchell, and
Henry Moon, 14 Apr. 1966, NAACP papers, group IV box A87, folder ‘Vietnam NAACP, 1966–1967’,
Library of Congress.
100 16 Apr. 1967 memo from Current to Spottswood, Mitchell, Moon, Morsell et al., p. 4, NAACP
papers, group IV box A87, folder ‘Vietnam NAACP, 1966–1967’, Library of Congress.
101 21 June 1967 memo, Current to all staﬀ members, NAACP papers, group IV box C24, folder
‘Greenwich Village–Chelsea, NY, 1966–1967’, Library of Congress. 102 Ibid.
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Anti-communism also aﬀected the way in which the NAACP viewed the
domestic peace movement, and the Association was not afraid to share its views.
Indeed the organization, from the earliest opportunity, red-baited the anti-war
movement. Writing in the New York Post in July 1965, Roy Wilkins referred to the
role of Martin Luther King’s ‘aides ’ in his decision to urge a negotiated peace in
Vietnam. He then went on to explain that, while in a broad sense all men were
brothers, Chinese Premier Chou En Lai was ‘no close relative. At least, he and his
are not close enough for me to ease my ﬁght here against racial bigotry in order to
enter into a foreign policy matter that seems to be of more than passing interest to Communist
China. ’103 After SNCC released its anti-war statement in January 1966 Wilkins
responded with a newspaper column claiming that it was following the ‘oﬃcial
leftist line ’.104
Support for the Cold War also resulted in much of the NAACP national
leadership viewing the Vietnam War as a just cause. Anti-communism blended
with patriotism, with the result that although the Association took no oﬃcial
policy on the conﬂict, its leaders were less inclined to be sympathetic to the anti-
war movement’s claims that America was intervening in a civil war under the
guise of preventing communist aggression. Herbert Hill acknowledged that most
of the Association’s leadership adhered to the traditional Cold War arguments,
‘ I think with very few exceptions they bought all of that, yeah. They were Cold
Warriors. ’105
V I I I
Until the spring of 1967, as Manfred Berg has noted, there was little organized
opposition within the NAACP toward the ‘no position ’ stance on Vietnam.106
However, this does not mean that the Association’s policy went unchallenged. It is
very diﬃcult to gauge the extent of opposition to the war within the NAACP,
but it is clear that there were many members who not only opposed the war
personally, but also worked to generate opposition to the war within the Associ-
ation. Although such activity was limited, its very existence helps to counter the
notion of a single, monolithic NAACP. Often local branches could be more
radical, and more ﬂexible, than the national oﬃce in New York City. Moreover,
anti-war sentiment within the NAACP during this period helps to explain its later
decision to oppose the war.
As Berg has documented, the ﬁrst sign of organized opposition to the war
within the NAACP came from the Flint, Michigan, branch in the spring of
1965.107 On 10 April, the branch’s executive board adopted a resolution urging
103 Roy Wilkins, ‘Sidetrack’, New York Post, 18 July 1965, Roy Wilkins papers, box 39, folder
‘Newspaper clippings, 1964–1965’, Library of Congress. My emphasis.
104 ‘SNCC’s foreign policy’, New York Post, 16 Jan. 1966, Roy Wilkins papers, box 39, folder
‘Newspaper column clippings, 1966’, Library of Congress.
105 Author’s interview with Herbert Hill, 16 May 2000.
106 Berg, ‘Guns, butter, and civil rights ’, p. 221. 107 Ibid., p. 215.
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LBJ to use his inﬂuence to mediate the ‘civil war ’ in Vietnam and arrange
negotiations between South Vietnam’s government and the Viet Cong. The re-
solution also called for American troops to be withdrawn immediately.108 At the
1965 annual convention, held in Denver, an attempt was made to force Vietnam
on to the agenda, and delegates from Flint played a role in the eﬀort to persuade
the Resolutions Committee to consider an anti-war resolution. The political and
organizational machinations of the NAACP bureaucracy ultimately helped
to ward oﬀ this threat. Herbert Hill candidly explained that the NAACP staﬀ
‘understood’ that the anti-war resolutions which invariably came up at conven-
tions would not be allowed to get to the ﬂoor, since the Resolutions Committee
was easy to manipulate – ‘ the NAACP was a very democratic institution … it
was, in terms of structure and forms. The conventions were very democratic. On
the other hand … like all democratic institutions there is bureaucratic control. ’109
One report of the convention explained that ‘ the closed operation of the
Resolutions Committee was likened to that of a ‘‘Star Chamber’’ ; delegates
complained that they could not tell what was going on’. One delegate claimed
that ‘ if the membership had not been so restricted by organization they might
have been more progressive ’.110 Hill is less sure that the delegates would have
voted in favour of the NAACP taking an anti-war position during this period.
While he believes that a majority of convention delegates in the mid-1960s might
have opposed the war he thinks that there would still have been a majority
favouring the no position approach:
there were two questions, and in fact it was clear to everybody … most of the rank and
ﬁle delegates, were interested in stopping the war … because black people were dis-
proportionately paying a very high price. That’s question number one. And on that
question I think it would have been an aﬃrmative answer. There’s an opposition to the
war, let’s get the hell out. It’s stupid … black people are dying. But if there’s another
question, simultaneously, is it in the interests of the NAACP and of the black community to
take a position, here I think it would have been very close. Quite possibly the majority
would have said we should have no position. There were two separate questions. Are we in
opposition to the war? Yes. Is it in our interest for the Association … to take a position,
then I’m not so sure … I think if it had have been put the second way, it is quite possible
it would have failed.111
A number of NAACP people were active in various peace campaigns during
the mid-1960s. Robert Scheer, who ran against Jeﬀrey Cohelan in California’s
seventh congressional district in 1966, was supported by Carlton Goodlett and Dr
Thomas Burbridge – both former presidents of the San Francisco NAACP.112
108 Flint, Michigan, resolution, 10 Apr. 1965, NAACP papers, group III box A328, folder ‘Vietnam
War, 1964–1965’, Library of Congress. 109 Author’s interview with Herbert Hill, 16 May 2000.
110 ‘NAACP convention: somemembers complain about ‘‘restrictions’’ ’,Movement (Aug. 1965), p. 6.
111 Author’s interview with Herbert Hill, 16 May 2000.
112 For a detailed account of this campaign see Serge Lang, The Scheer campaign (New York, 1967) ;
George Kaufmann, ‘Condemn war and ghettos’, Berkeley Barb, 2 no. 3 (21 Jan. 1966), p. 1 ; ﬁnding aid,
Carlton B. Goodlett papers, 1942–67, SHSW.
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In New York’s 26th congressional district Leslie Roberts was campaigning for
election. The forty-four-year-old Jamaican immigrant, a local NAACP activist,
was the ﬁrst African American to seek congressional nomination inWestchester.113
He opposed the war and argued for negotiations with the Viet Cong. Roberts’s
campaign literature emphasized Vietnam’s negative eﬀects on the war on
poverty – ‘you can drive through the streets of Westchester any day of the week
and see casualties of the Vietnam War. Those families living in the peeling
old houses with no toilets or hot water, they’re Vietnam casualties. Those men
standing on street corners with no jobs, no training, no hope – they’re Vietnam
casualties. ’114 In 1968, NAACP ﬁeld secretary Charles Evers ran for Congress in
Mississippi’s third district. The brother of the martyred Medgar had been a
bootlegger and petty criminal in Chicago before heading to the Magnolia State
to become the Association’s ﬁrst self-appointed ﬁeld secretary, and he remained
a divisive and controversial ﬁgure.115 Evers declared ‘I am against the war. I will
not have our people ﬁght for someone else’s freedom when they are going to have
to come home and have to ﬁght in this country for their own freedom … I am
also against our lily-white draft boards and will see that the boards are made
representative of all the people. ’116
There was also anti-war activity in some NAACP branches. In the spring of
1966, for example, members of the Lunenburg County (VA) branch were ‘dis-
turbed about the expanding war in Vietnam and the consequence it might have
on the Federal government’s domestic program’.117 The leading opponent of
the VietnamWar within the NAACP was the Greenwich Village (NY) branch. In
February 1966, it decided to hold a forum to discuss the links between the peace
and civil rights movements, but the NAACP national oﬃce had requested that
this be cancelled.118 At the 1966 and 1967 conventions, the Greenwich Village
branch sought to introduce anti-war resolutions.119
Evidence of serious dissent with the Association’s Vietnam policy did not
surface until the autumn of 1967. In October, the Michigan State Conference
adopted an anti-war resolution. The resolution noted the war’s detrimental eﬀect
on the anti-poverty programmes, the high numbers of black casualties, and
the reluctance of the South Vietnamese Army to ﬁght ; and it called for an un-
conditional bombing halt and a gradual de-escalation of the war.120 Later that
113 See Roberts’s campaign material, National Coordinating Committee to End the War in
Vietnam records, 1964–7, series 1, box 4, folder ‘Peace candidates, 1966’, SHSW. 114 Ibid.
115 See Payne, I’ve got the light of freedom, pp. 360–1; and Dittmer, Local people, p. 178.
116 Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP) newsletter, vol. 2 no. 6 (c. Feb. 1968), SHSW.
117 The New Virginia newsletter, vol. 2 no. 1 (Mar. 1966), SNCC records, reel 44, Library of Congress.
118 Advance, 6 no. 4 (1966), p. 1, in NAACP papers, group IV box J7, folder ‘Printed matter NAACP
by states, New York – NYC – Greenwich Village, 1966–1967’, Library of Congress.
119 NAACP papers, group IV box A87, folder ‘Vietnam NAACP, 1966–1967’, Library of Congress ;
and Berg, ‘Guns, butter, and civil rights ’, p. 221.
120 10 Oct. 1967, Current memo to Dr John Morsell – copy of resolution on Vietnam adopted
by Michigan State Conference, in NAACP papers, group IV box A87, folder ‘Vietnam NAACP,
1966–1967’, Library of Congress.
692 S I MO N HA L L
month, largely due to the eﬀorts of younger activists, the New York State NAACP
adopted an anti-war resolution during a stormy session at its convention. Initially,
older NAACP members had blocked attempts to oppose the war. But nineteen-
year-old Gerald Taylor led the youth contingent in an eighteen-minute demon-
stration that forced the issue on to the ﬂoor. Ultimately, the delegates voted by
107 to 72 to ask the NAACP national board of directors to ‘use its good oﬃces to
urge an immediate termination of hostilities in [Vietnam]’.121 Often there was a
generational element to anti-war feeling within the Association. In New Orleans,
the local NAACP Youth Council had supported King’s Riverside Speech, and
the group’s twenty-one-year-old vice-president, Raymond DuVernay, had been
jailed that February for draft resistance.122 Furthermore, in early 1967, the
NAACP’s Youth and College Division had called for a system of voluntary
national service as an alternative to the ‘unjust ’ draft.123
I X
Although the policy of treating civil rights and Vietnam as distinct and uncon-
nected issues was upheld until 1969, it was weakened by a number of factors. First,
the claim that foreign policy issues lay outside the NAACP’s gamut was, in fact,
incongruous with the Association’s history. Throughout its existence the NAACP
had engaged with international aﬀairs and debated the nature of America’s role
in the world. Early leaders of the Association, such as Moorﬁeld Storey and
Oswald Garrison Villard, had frequently spoken out against American foreign
policy ; and the organization had sometimes adopted criticial positions.124 For
example, in 1915 the Association had condemned the American occupation
of Haiti. The NAACP also spoke out against the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in
1935, and for most of the 1940s it had consistently passed anti-colonial and anti-
imperialist resolutions.125 As one history teacher at Michigan State University
121 See Thomas A. Johnson, ‘State’s NAACP opposes the war and new charter ’, New York Times,
23 Oct. 1967; Carolyn Dixon, ‘NAACP youths ‘‘rough’’ ’, New York Amsterdam News, 28 Oct. 1967; and
Advance, 6 no. 27 (1967), p. 4; NAACP papers, group IV box J7, folder ‘Printed matter NAACP by states,
New York – NYC – Greenwich Village, 1966–1967’, Library of Congress.
122 DuVernay had refused to be a ‘black mercenary for white imperialism’, see ‘Many challenge
war, draft ’, Southern Patriot, Feb. 1967, p. 8.
123 Adam Fairclough, Race and democracy : the civil rights struggle in Louisiana, 1915–1972 (Athens and
London, 1995), p. 417; and NAACP News, Feb. 1967, in NAACP papers, group IV box J11, folder
‘Printed matter – west coast regional oﬃce newsletters, 1966–April, 1967’, Library of Congress.
124 See letter from William B. Hixon, Jr, to the New York Times, dated 10 Apr. 1967, reprinted in Dr
Martin Luther King, Dr John C. Bennett, Dr Henry Steele Commager, Rabbi Abraham Heschel speak on the war in
Vietnam – with an introduction by Dr Reinhold Neibuhr, p. 29, in Records of the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference, 1954–1970, Part 4 : Records of the Program Department (microﬁlm edition), editorial adviser
Cynthia P. Lewis (University Publications of America, 1995), reel 26, series VII, records of the Peace
Education Project, 1966–7 cont., box 176, folder 8 ‘Vietnam summer, 1967–1968’, Library of
Congress.
125 See Leon D. Pamphile, ‘The NAACP and the American occupation of Haiti ’, Phylon,
47 no. 1 (1986) ; David Levering Lewis,W. E. B. Du Bois, biography of a race, 1868–1919 (New York, 1993),
p. 522; Brenda Gayle Plummer, Rising wind: black America and U.S. foreign aﬀairs, 1935–1960 (Chapel Hill
and London, 1996), pp. 40–51; and Horne, Black and red, pp. 20, 21, and 26.
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explained in a letter to the New York Times, ‘ it has been forgotten that the pre-
cedent of a civil-rights organization … criticizing American foreign policy, was
not set by Stokely Carmichael … but by the NAACP’.126 After the organization’s
shift to anti-communism at the end of the 1940s, foreign policy still remained an
area of concern – the NAACP passed a resolution supporting American actions
in Korea at its 1951 annual convention, for example.127 While Roy Wilkins and
other NAACP leaders may have stated that foreign policy and civil rights should
not be mixed, they cannot but have been aware of the history of their own
organization. It was a history that suggested exactly the opposite.
The policy was further undermined by the fact that, on occasion, the NAACP
came close to full public support for the war.128 In December 1965, replying to
a critic of the NAACP’s Vietnam stance, John Morsell explained that he was
‘ thoroughly convinced of the righteousness of the objective’.129 In January 1966,
Roy Wilkins expressed support for the Johnson administration’s Vietnam policy
when he wired Lyndon Johnson that ‘your call for carrying on domestic crusade
for the Great Society projects including all aspects of anti-poverty program along
with fulﬁlling our nation’s commitment in Vietnam is the right call and is a challenge to
every American’.130 In the spring of 1967 the NAACP’s executive director oﬀered
a partial endorsement of the war eﬀort :
I don’t speak as a hawk or a dove … But, is it wrong for people to be patriotic? Is it wrong
for us to back up our boys in the ﬁeld … They’re dying while we’re kniﬁng them in the back
at home …Maybe I’m a bit old fashioned … maybe we are wrong, maybe we shouldn’t be
in Vietnam. But when you’re out there in the trenches being ﬁred at, you have to ﬁght
back.131
Some critics believed that, in travelling to Vietnam in July 1966, Whitney
Young had given implicit endorsement to the war, whilst others accused him of
being a tool of the Johnson administration.132 Cecil B. Moore, the militant head of
the Philadelphia NAACP, for example, bitterly denounced Young and claimed
that he had been used to ‘whitewash’ racial discrimination in Vietnam.133 But,
the following year, the Urban League’s executive director explicitly ﬂouted the
policy of keeping civil rights and Vietnam separate. During the summer of 1967
Young appears to have experienced a wobble over his support of the guns and
butter policy. At the NUL national conference, held in Portland, Oregon, at the
end of August, Young explained that he was no longer sure that it was possible to
126 See letter from William B. Hixon, Jr, to the New York Times, dated 10 Apr. 1967, in SCLC records,
part 4, reel 26, Library of Congress.
127 Quoted in ‘NAACP stand on colonialism and U.S. foreign policy’, Crisis, 62 no. 1 ( Jan. 1955),
p. 25. 128 See Berg, ‘Guns, butter and civil rights ’, p. 220.
129 Letter, JohnMorsell to HenryWallace, 10 Jan. 1966, pp. 1–2, NAACP papers, group IV box A86,
folder ‘Vietnam correspondence, 1966’, Library of Congress.
130 13 Jan. 1966, telegram from Roy Wilkins to LBJ, WHCF name ﬁle – Roy Wilkins, LBJ. See also
Berg, ‘Guns, butter, and civil rights ’, p. 220, my emphasis.
131 ‘Wilkins raps King’s civil rights policy’, Worcester Sunday Telegram, 19 Apr. 1967, NAACP papers,
group IV box A86, folder ‘Vietnam correspondence, 1967–1968’, Library of Congress.
132 Dickerson, Militant mediator, pp. 270 and 271–3. 133 Ibid., pp. 273–4.
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have both guns and butter, and that if it came to a choice, ‘ the ﬁrst priority ought
to be peace and justice here at home’.134
It was after this wobble that President Johnson telephoned Young to tell him
that he wanted him to be part of the American delegation to observe the elections
in South Vietnam. Young was reluctant to go but was faced with little choice after
LBJ applied some of his infamous treatment – ‘Whitney, you wanted a Negro on
the Supreme Court and I put on one … Now I want a Negro on this group going
to Vietnam …Well Whitney, I’m going to announce you as one of the team, and
if you feel you can’t serve your country, you explain it to the press. ’135 Andrew
Young believed that Young had been tricked into supporting the administration
and, conﬁrming the wobble theory, suggested that the NUL executive director
had been experiencing ‘ inner conﬂict ’ over the Vietnam War.136 It is likely that
Marcia Young’s opposition to the VietnamWar contributed to this inner turmoil.
Young’s eldest daughter, a student at Bryn Mawr College, engaged in a hunger
fast as part of her anti-war protests.137
In accepting this mission, albeit reluctantly, Young became a ‘signiﬁcant
participant in a major foreign policy matter ’, and seriously compromised
his position of neutrality regarding the war itself. The twenty-two-man US
delegation, that included senators, governors, mayors, churchmen, businessmen
and labour leaders, arrived in Saigon on Wednesday, 30 August. Young made
the journey aboard Air Force One carrying serious concerns about the war.138
However, he returned impressed with the election eﬀort in South Vietnam, which
had taken place under unusual and diﬃcult circumstances.139 Young had been
particularly struck by the South Vietnamese enthusiasm for the elections – in
which South Vietnam’s military leaders, Nguyen Cao Ky and Nguyen Van
Thieu, claimed victory with 35 per cent of the vote. The election observers
ignored charges that major opponents of the Thieu–Ky regime had been pre-
vented from running or had been jailed, as well as reports of voter intimidation
and fraud, to declare that the elections had been ‘reasonably eﬃcient, free, and
honest ’.140 At an hour-long debrieﬁng with the president in September, Young
declared that he was ‘completely satisﬁed that these were free elections as well as
could be expected under the conditions ’. He also stated that America might learn
some lessons from South Vietnam’s version of democracy – such as allowing
eighteen-year-olds to vote.141 But perhaps it was another observer, John Knight
134 Weiss, Whitney M. Young, Jr., p. 161.
135 Ibid., p. 162. LBJ was referring to the recent appointment of Thurgood Marshall to the US
Supreme Court.
136 Andrew Young, An easy burden : the civil rights movement and the transformation of America (New York,
1996), p. 431. 137 Ibid., p. 431; and Weiss, Whitney M. Young, Jr., p. 168.
138 Weiss, Whitney M. Young, Jr., p. 162. 139 Ibid.
140 Dickerson, Militant mediator, pp. 278–9.
141 Diary backup, box 75, 6 Sept. 1967, memo from Jim Jones to LBJ, 6 Sept. 1967, subject : meeting
with Vietnam election observers in the cabinet room (meeting lasted from 11:09 a.m. to 12:05 p.m.),
p. 3, LBJ.
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of Knight Newspapers, who best exempliﬁed the US government’s attitude toward
democracy in South Vietnam. Addressing concerns about the repression of
political opponents during the elections, he told Johnson that he had ‘sought
out dissidents such as the suspended editors and the candidates who were not
permitted to run and he heard them out thoroughly and fully and at the close he
had the opinion that he would not want them running his country ’.142
In joining the American delegation to observe the South Vietnamese elections,
Whitney Young had stretched the policy of treating civil rights and Vietnam as
unconnected issues to breaking point, and in the process severely compromised
his own neutrality over the war.143 Young had moved beyond using Vietnam
for the purposes of gleaning domestic political concessions to become a reluctant
supporter of the Johnson Administration’s foreign policy. SNCC’s John Wilson
described the Urban League leader as a ‘puppet ’ of the American government,
and claimed that ‘[Young] was used by the US government to make those [South
Vietnamese] elections appear legitimate in the eyes of black people. ’144
X
From 1969, the moderates’ position on the war changed from one of ‘golden
silence ’ to cautious opposition. Richard Nixon’s election to the presidency in
November 1968 made it easier for them to oppose Vietnam. Although revisionist
historians have attempted to paint Nixon as a progressive on the race question,
most black leaders at the time viewed him as at best unsympathetic to their cause,
and at worst a disaster for it.145 Nixon’s attempts to end the war in Vietnam by
winning it also generated a good deal of dovish outpouring from the Democratic
Party. The need for black leaders to maintain silence on the war in order to pro-
mote the coalition strategy quickly evaporated. Moreover, from 1968, anti-war
sentiment itself moved from the radical fringe to the mainstream – aided by the
presidential campaigns of Robert Kennedy and Eugene McCarthy ; the growth of
anti-war sentiment among liberal Democrats and moderate Republicans ; and the
emergence of a liberal, respectable anti-war movement.
Anti-war moderates recognized that the peace movement’s ‘melange of
Maoism and Stalinism with Negro nationalism’ had resulted in it being one of the
few things in America that was more unpopular than the war itself.146 Draft card
burnings, revolutionary rhetoric, counterculturalism, and anti-Americanism had
142 Ibid., p. 4, LBJ.
143 For example, after returning from observing the elections, the Johnson administration tried to
involve Young in eﬀorts to justify the war. He was sent a speech written by a presidential aid to help
him gain a ‘better understanding of the Government’s position and the steps that led to our present
involvement in Vietnam’, see Dickerson, Militant mediator, p. 280.
144 Statement by John Wilson in Bratislava, Cz. Conference between Vietnamese and Americans.
(summer/August 1967), p. 4, SNCC records (microﬁlm edition), reel 23, Library of Congress.
145 See Joan Hoﬀ, Nixon reconsidered (New York, 1994) ; and Dean J. Kotlowski, Nixon’s civil rights :
politics, principle, and policy (Cambridge, MA, 2002).
146 I. F. Stone’s Weekly, 28 June 1965, p. 1, quoted in David Cochran, ‘ I. F. Stone and the new left :
protesting U.S. policy in Vietnam’, Historian, 53 (1991), p. 517.
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done little to endear the peace movement to mainstream America.147 By the late
1960s, there were growing numbers of anti-war activists arguing for a change in
focus and tactics on the part of the peace movement, in order to make it more
eﬀective. Many of these forces came together in the Vietnam Moratorium
Committee (VMC), which was founded in the summer of 1969.148
Although VMC members opposed the war in Vietnam, they still believed
in working within the two party system. Sam Brown, veteran of the McCarthy
campaign and VMC co-ordinator, understood that potential peace supporters
were put oﬀ by long hair, campus protest, and ‘anything which irritates the nerve
endings of middle-class values ’, and that when the Silent Majority were pitted
against the radicals there could only ever be one winner.149 The Moratorium
believed that ‘only a peace movement which reaches Richard Nixon’s constitu-
ency can stop it ’.150 The organization hoped to move the anti-war movement
beyond its student base, which it considered to be ineﬀectual, and to nurture a
new peace leadership composed of ‘Senators, Congressmen, governors, mayors,
businessmen – all the straight people who are willing to make a ﬁrm and
unequivocal commitment against the war. ’151
The VMC’s eﬀorts received support from the moderate wing of the civil
rights movement. During 1967, Whitney Young had set aside his concerns about
Vietnam to oﬀer a virtual endorsement of the war when he travelled to South
Vietnam to observe the elections. Yet, in the aftermath of the Tet oﬀensive and
LBJ’s withdrawal from the presidential race, Young re-evaluated his opinion of
the war in light of the continued suﬀering in Southeast Asia, and his doubts
re-surfaced. He came to believe that Martin Luther King had been ‘more right ’
about the war than he; and, perhaps freed politically now that a Republican
occupied the White House, felt able to express his concerns publicly.152 There was
also pressure from below – in a meeting with Urban League trustees on 7 October
1969, Young spoke of the ‘ terriﬁc pressure ’ from the ‘black community ’, youth
and white liberals for the organization to take a position against the war.153
Although Young was unable to accept an invitation to speak at the 15 October
anti-war rally in Washington DC, he did release a statement.154 In it Young
explained that he had, for some time, been viewing America’s ‘agony in Vietnam
with a sense of deepening distress ’. He went on to declare that :
I am totally convinced that this war has an extra dimension for black people that it does not
have for many whites. We are suﬀering doubly. We are dying for something abroad that
we do not have at home.
147 See William R. Berkowitz, ‘The impact of anti-Vietnam demonstrations upon national public
opinion and military indicators’, Social Science Research, 2 (1973) ; E. M. Schreiber, ‘Anti-war demon-
strations and American public opinion on the war in Vietnam’, British Journal of Sociology, 27 (1976) ;
and Robert E. Lane and Michael Lerner, ‘Why hard-hats hate hairs ’, Psychology Today (New York)
(Nov. 1970), p. 45.
148 Francine de Plessix Gray, ‘The moratorium and the new mobe’, New Yorker, 3 Jan. 1970.
149 Sam Brown, ‘The politics of peace’, Washington Monthly, 2 (1970), pp. 26 and 44.
150 Ibid., p. 25. 151 Ibid., p. 45. 152 Dickerson, Militant mediator, p. 282.
153 Ibid., p. 281. 154 Weiss, Whitney M. Young, Jr., p. 194.
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I am further convinced that the most eﬀective way for America to win credibility as
a democracy in the eyes of the world is through the immediate resolution of its domestic
crisis rather than through expansion of its defense capability.155
Using language that was reminiscent of Martin Luther King’s, Young charged
that the Vietnam War had ‘ twisted America’s soul ’, before concluding with a
demand for an ‘ immediate termination’ of the conﬂict.156
Support also came from the NAACP. With anti-war feeling rising among the
American population, with the emergence of a respectable anti-war movement,
and with the election of Nixon, peace advocates were able to prosper within the
NAACP for the ﬁrst time. At the Association’s 60th annual convention, held in
Jackson, Mississippi, anti-war sentiment ﬁnally began to ﬂourish. On 1 July, at the
annual Minister’s Breakfast, Los Angeles clergyman Rev. Thomas E. Kilgore,
president of the American Baptist Convention, told his audience that ‘our values
are inverted … we cannot go on killing in Vietnam’.157 While the NAACP del-
egates reaﬃrmed that the Association was primarily a civil rights organization,
they also noted that ‘billions of dollars are being spent in a cruel, inhuman,
and unjust war in Vietnam’, and called upon the United States government to
‘ institute the speediest measures to withdraw American troops from Vietnam and
concentrate our wealth and skills on peaceful measures to prosecute our own
domestic war on poverty ’.158 It was within this context that the NAACP came
to oﬀer limited support to the VMC. In October, James Blacke, national vice-
president in charge of youth aﬀairs, agreed to send out a mailing urging full
support of the Moratorium. In his capacity as an NAACP oﬃcial, Blacke also
endorsed a statement that called for an immediate cease-ﬁre and ‘prompt’
withdrawal of American soldiers from Vietnam.159
X I
Despite these developments, the moderate civil rights movement never partici-
pated in anti-war activities with any great enthusiasm. Whitney Young’s untimely
death in March 1971 perhaps prevented greater involvement, but the NAACP
remained reluctant to devote time and energies to the struggle for peace. In
January 1971, for example, Jerry Gordon of the National Peace Action Coalition
(NPAC), a major anti-war organization, wrote to RoyWilkins requesting NAACP
endorsement of the forthcoming anti-war actions. One might have expected the
Association to respond positively. Not only had it adopted an anti-war position,
but the NAACP was also a staunch opponent of the Nixon Administration.160
155 NUL press release, 13 Oct. 1969, in Vietnam Moratorium Committee (VMC) records, box 4,
folder 6. ‘Statement by Whitney M. Young, Jr., on Vietnam’, p. 2, SHSW. 156 Ibid.
157 NAACP annual report, 1969, p. 147. 158 Ibid., p. 155.
159 VMC records, box 4, folder 6, ‘National youth leaders endorse moratorium’, press release,
11 Oct. 1969, SHSW.
160 At its June 1970 convention, NAACP chairman Bishop Stephen Spottswood had declared that
‘ this is the ﬁrst time since 1920 that the national administration has made it a matter of calculated
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Despite these developments, Wilkins refused to give organizational support to
the peace movement. Although he wrote to Gordon that ‘we, too, believe that the
war ought to be brought to a rapid close and share your concern about its
re-escalation’, the NAACP executive director explained that the Association
would be unable oﬃcially to endorse the anti-war actions as it was concentrating
on a membership drive, and Wilkins feared that anti-war activities would prove a
distraction.161 Wilkins’s decision did not, however, prevent NAACP participation
in the massive 24 April rally, held in Washington, DC – which was endorsed
by Lonnie King, president of the Atlanta NAACP; Kate Moore, of the NAACP
national staﬀ; and the Detroit NAACP among others.162
There were a number of reasons why the moderate wing of the civil rights
movement did not participate enthusiastically in the peace movement, even
after they adopted an anti-war stance. First, securing advances for black
Americans remained the raison d’eˆtre of groups like the NAACP. The Greenwich
Village branch, which had been one of the ﬁercest critics of the ‘no position ’
policy in the mid-1960s believed that the Association had to ‘keep its eye on
the main emphasis … the ongoing ﬁght for ﬁrst-class citizenship ’ for non-white
Americans.163 Despite the eﬀorts of some radical peace organizations, the anti-
war movement never transformed itself into a multi-issue coalition seeking
fundamental change to the American socio-economic and political system. The
peace movement’s use of rhetoric that appealed to blacks did not disguise the
paucity of tangible action on behalf of Afro-America. Roy Wilkins’s complaint
that the anti-war movement was manipulating African Americans ‘ for the beneﬁt
of causes connected only in an oratorical fashion to Negro jobs, schools, voting
and slums here at home’ had a good deal of merit.164 As the radical Guardian
newspaper editorialized in February 1970, ‘an antiwar movement which … only
gives token support to 23 million blacks … cannot expect black Americans to
enlist in the actions of the antiwar coalitions ’.165
Second, there was not enough pressure from below to force the moderates to
involve themselves more fully in anti-war activities. Most members of groups like
the NAACP and the Urban League reﬂected the feelings of most Americans –
who opposed the war in Vietnam but did not take to the streets to demand a US
policy to work against the needs and aspirations of the largest minority of its citizens ’. See ‘NAACP
sternly critical of Nixon administration’, Guardian, 11 July 1970, p. 4.
161 Letter from Jerry Gordon to Roy Wilkins, 22 Jan. 1971, and Wilkins’s reply of 1 Feb., National
Peace Action Coalition records, reel 4, SHSW.
162 ‘Preliminary endorsers of the April 24th march on Washington, D.C. and San Francisco for the
immediate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from South East Asia ’, George Wiley papers, box 32, folder 3,
SHSW.
163 NAACP papers, group VI, box C174, folder ‘Branch development, newsletters, New York, 1969’,
Advance, 7 no. 50 (1969), Greenwich Village–Chelsea branch, p. 4 – ‘President’s corner’, Library of
Congress.
164 Roy Wilkins, ‘LBJ’s programs would aid negro’, Detroit News, 26 Aug. 1967, oﬃce ﬁles of
Frederick Panzer, box 331, folder – civil rights 1967–8, LBJ.
165 ‘Vietpoint’, Guardian, 7 Feb. 1970, p. 10.
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withdrawal. African Americans may have been the ‘most dovish ’ social group,
but this did not translate into anti-war activism.166 Without pressure from below,
the moderates could adopt an anti-war position without having to do very much
about it.
Finally, the precipitous decline of the civil rights movement itself also prevented
more black support for the peace movement. The late 1960s and early 1970s were
a period of retrenchment, in which black groups sought to defend the gains
already made. In such a context, involvement in anti-war activities was at best an
unwelcome distraction. Indeed, those civil rights groups that did oppose the war
in Vietnam vociferously, and adopted a radical critique of American society –
such as SNCC, CORE, the SCLC, and the Black Panthers – suﬀered catastrophic
atrophy in the late 1960s and early 1970s. While the NAACP and Urban League
also declined, they survived as mass-based national organizations, capable of
wielding inﬂuence and a measure of power. Perhaps their caution in the mid–late
1960s over issues such as Vietnam was justiﬁed.
The moderate black movement’s response to Vietnam tells us much about
the nature of the civil rights movement itself. When SNCC bitterly denounced
the war in Vietnam in January 1966 they were not merely subscribing to leftist
dogma. When Roy Wilkins asked whether it was wrong for people to be patriotic
and to support American troops ﬁghting abroad he was not simply being an
Uncle Tom.167 Both these responses were, in large part, shaped by civil rights
movement experience. For groups like SNCC and CORE, 1960–5 were years of
disillusionment and radicalization. The refusal of the federal government to
protect black workers from white violence, and the liberal betrayal at Atlantic
City, undermined their faith in the American system – which they began to view
as in need of fundamental change. This aﬀected their response to the war – as one
civil rights worker put it, ‘our criticism of Vietnam … does not come from what
we know of Vietnam, but from what we know of America ’.168 But for moderates
like Roy Wilkins and Whitney Young, their experience during these years
aﬃrmed their faith in America. Their goal – the full participation of black
Americans in all areas of national life – seemed to be achievable. The passage
of landmark civil rights legislation in 1964 and 1965, and the Great Society
programmes, indicated that the United States was ﬁnally making real its founding
promise of freedom and equality for all. There was thus nothing to gain, and
a good deal to lose, by alienating liberals and the Johnson administration by
opposing the war in Vietnam.
Many historians have viewed the war as a major contributor to the fracture
and ultimate collapse of the civil rights movement in the late 1960s. Robert Cook,
166 TomWells, The war within : America’s battle over Vietnam (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1994),
p. 70.
167 SNCC statement on the Vietnam War, 6 Jan. 1966, in Teodori, The new left, pp. 251–2; and
‘Wilkins raps King’s civil rights policy’,Worcester Sunday Telegram, 19 Apr. 1967; NAACP papers, group
IV box A86, folder ‘Vietnam correspondence, 1967–1968’, Library of Congress.
168 Howard Zinn, unpublished article, winter 1965, in Howard Zinn papers, box 3, folder 5, SHSW.
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for example, has claimed that ‘ the intensiﬁcation of US military intervention
in Southeast Asia … contributed further to the decline of the civil rights
coalition’.169 With the unity provided by opposition to Jim Crow and black
disfranchisement gone, and with diﬃcult problems of economic inequality and
political powerlessness remaining, the movement would likely have come under
serious strain after 1965 even without the added complication of Vietnam. While
the war’s role in the fragmentation of the civil rights movement has yet to be fully
determined, the range of responses by black leaders and civil rights groups to
Vietnam suggests that the war was important in highlighting existing divisions as
well as in creating new ones.
169 Cook, Sweet land of liberty?, p. 176. Manfred Berg shares this assessment – see ‘Guns, butter, and
civil rights ’, pp. 213–14.
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